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HORTON V. CALIFORNIA*: THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE LOSES ITS INADVERTENCY
Under the fourth amendment1 of the United States Constitution, police must conduct searches and seizures pursuant to search
warrants which specifically describe the place to be searched and
the items to be seized.2 One exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine.3 In Coolidge v.
* 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
2. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2305-06 (1990). The Supreme Court
has long considered general searches to be a violation of an individual's fundamental privacy rights. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978)
("the general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution"); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481
(1965) (the "hated" writs of assistance gave customs officials blanket authority
to search anywhere they pleased); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724
(1961) (a government with the power of search and seizure is a prelude to a
system of suppression); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (debate
over general searches led to the colomal resistance of Great Britain). In Boyd,
Justice Bradley wrote:
The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to
the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced 'the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book,' since they placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer.'
Id. See generally Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DE PAUL L. REV. 817 (1989) (analysis of Framers' intent concerning
the fourth amendment); Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourth AmendmentPlazn View Exception to the Warrant Requirement-Extgent CircumstancesWashington v. Chrisman, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 125, 126-127 (1984) (same).
3. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2306. Commentators generally refer to United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) as the first plain view case, although the Court
never actually used the phrase "plain view." Moylan, The Plazn View Doctrine:
Unexpected Child of the Great "SearchIncident" GeographyBattle, 26 MERCER
L. REV. 1047 n.2 (1975); Comment, ConstitutionalStandardsfor Applying the
Plazn View Doctrine, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 725,734 (1974). In Lee, revenue officers
aboard a Coast Guard cutter looked, with the aid of a searchlight, onto the deck
of the defendant's motorboat and saw cases of contraband whiskey. Lee, 274
U.S. at 561. In the opinion, Justice Brandeis concluded that this observation
was not a search, and therefore, was not protected by the fourth amendment.
Id. at 563.
Subsequent to Lee, the plain view doctrine developed as a marginal factor
in the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Moylan,
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supra, at 1048. The permissible extent of a search incident to arrest had alternated over a long period between broad and limited scopes. The Supreme Court
first applied the search incident to arrest exception in Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192 (1927), although the exception had been articulated earlier as dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). In Matron,the
Court upheld the seizure of a ledger taken from a closet in which police officers
were searching for contraband liquor incident to a lawful arrest. Marron, 275
U.S. at 199. The Court established a virtually unlimited scope to a search incident to arrest by concluding that "[tihe authority of officers to search and seize
the things by which the nuisance was being maintained extended to all parts of
the premises used for the unlawful purpose." Id The Court did not discuss a
plain view exception, perhaps because plain view was moot due to the broad
scope given to the search incident to arrest. However, the Court did rule that
only items particularly described in a warrant could be seized so that "nothing
is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Id at 196.
The Supreme Court later limited the scope of Matron in Go-Bart Importmg Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932). In both cases the Court held unlawful the searches of office
desks and cabinets, despite the fact that the searches had accompanied lawful
arrests. Go-Bart, 285 U.S. at 467; Lejkowitz, 282 U.S. at 358. The Court distinguished Marron by stating that the items seized in Matron were in plain view
and were seized as an mcadent of the arrest rather than in a general search. GoBart, 285 U.S. at 465; Leficowitz, 282 U.S. at 358.
Fifteen years later, in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court virtually ignored GoBart and LeflRkwitz by holding that a search may extend to the entire premises
where the arrest is made. Id at 153. As in Matron,the Court did not mention
plain view since the broad scope given to searches incident to arrest made any
discussion unnecessary. However, Justice Murphy's dissent predicted the plain
view doctrine by referring to a "plain sight" seizure. Justice Murphy explained
that a "[s]eizure may be made of articles and papers on the person of the one
arrested." In so doing, Justice Murphy indicated that "the arresting officer is
free to look around and seize those fruits and evidences of crime which are in
plain sight and in his immediate and discernible presence." I& at 186 (citations
omitted).
Shortly thereafter, the Court reversed itself again in Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled, United States v. Rabmowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) by holding that the arrest of a defendant operating an illegal distillery
was valid because the agents actually saw the defendant operating the distillery.
However, the search of the premises and the seizure of the still were held unlawful since the agents had ample time to procure a search warrant but failed to
do so. Id. at 705. The government argued that an arresting officer may look
around at the time of arrest and seize items of crime or contraband which are in
"plain sight." Id. at 704. However, the Court concluded that the government
failed to explain why the agents could not have obtained a search warrant. Id.
at 708. Thus, Truptano was the first case which stated the requirement of "inadvertence" in fourth amendment law. See &nfranote 60 for a discussion of the
inadvertence requirement.
In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) the Court rejected the
rule of Truptano and held that the test was "not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." The Rabznowitz Court allowed in evidence, despite the fact that government agents
searched an office for over an hour as incident to arrest, and subsequently
seized 573 stamps with forged overprints. Id. at 59.
The Supreme Court finally defined the parameters of a search incident to
arrest in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chzmel, the Court addressed the issue of whether the warrantless search of the petitioner's entire
house could be constitutionally justified as incident to an arrest. Id. at 755. The
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New Hampshire,4 the United States Supreme Court formally recognized this exception by delineating the elements of the plain view
doctrine, which included the requirement that the discovery of
items seized must be inadvertent. 5 In Horton v. Californma,6 the
United States Supreme Court addressed the specific issue of
whether the fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless seizure of
evidence in plain view if the discovery of the evidence is not madvertent.7 The Horton Court held that inadvertence is not required
Court held that a search incident to arrest was justified for an area within the
arrestee's immediate control, which was defined as the area from within which
the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Id- at
763. In Chzmel, the Court established the scope of a search incident to arrest,
but failed to define the proper scope of the plain view doctrine.
4. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
5. Id. at 469. In Coolidge, the Court attempted to establish guidelines for
the plain view doctrine which would answer any lingering questions left by the
Supreme Court's mconsistent rulings on search incident to arrest and plain
view exceptions. The Coolidge Court held that a warrantless seizure of items in
plain view was lawful if the officers are in a position to observe the items lawfully, the discovery of the items is "inadvertent," and the mcrimnmating nature
of the items is immediately apparent. Id. at 465-70.
Justice Stewart, in Coolidge, stated that the rationale for the inadvertence
requirement was to prevent limited, lawful searches from turning mto general,
unconstitutional searches. Id. at 469-70. Justice Stewart concluded that the
plain view exception was justified when there was a great inconvemence to police officers in procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery. Id. However, Justice Stewart went on to say "where the discovery is anticipated, where
the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it,
the situation is altogether different." Id. Finally, Justice Stewart indicated that
"[t]he requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no mconvemence whatever, or
at least none which is constitutionally cognizable." Id. at 470.
Coolidge involved the seizure of two cars parked in plain view in defendant's driveway during his arrest. Id. at 447. The Coolidge Court held that the
police officer's warrantless seizure and subsequent vacuuming of these cars violated the fourth amendment. I&. at 473. The Court based its holding on the
conclusion that the police had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant for the
cars and they intended to seize the cars when they went to the defendant's
property. Id at 472. Consequently, the prosecution could not introduce at trial
any evidence that the police obtained in the illegal vacuuming of the cars. Id. at
473.
For significant Supreme Court plain view cases since Coolidge, see Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that officers must have probable cause to
believe that items are related to criminal activity in order to seize them under
plain view); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plain view doctrine applied to
automobile search); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (officers may
accompany arrested individuals to private areas after arrest and seize items
under the plain view doctrine).
6. 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990).
7. Id at 2304. In Horton, the Court considered the unresolved issue of
what requirements were necessary for lawful seizure of evidence under the
plain view doctrine because the Coolidge Court failed to obtain a majority opinion on the plain view issue. Id. at 2305. In the Coolidge plurality opinion, only
four members of the court (Stewart, J., Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall,
J.) signed the portion of Justice Stewart's opinion which proposed the adoption
of new restrictions to the plain view doctrine. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 444-45.
Although Justice Harlan concurred m the judgment, he did not join in the por-
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for lawful plain view seiures, despite its acknowledgment that inadvertence is a common characteristic of most legitimate plain view
seizures. 8 In so ruling, the Supreme Court took another step towards eliminating the possessory interest which the fourth amendment protects. 9
In Horton, two masked men robbed the treasurer of the San
Jose Corn Club.10 Following an investigation of the armed robbery,
the police officers determined that there was probable cause to
search the defendant's residence.1 ' In submitting their application
for the search warrant, the officers incorporated police reports detailing the stolen property and the weapons used by the robbers
into their affidavit.12 However, the magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the police to search solely for three specifically described
rings.' 3 During the course of the search of the defendant's home
tion of the opinon dealing with the plain view restrictions. I

at 490-92

(Harlan, J., concurring). The four remaining 3ustices (Black, J., Burger, J.,
Blackmun, J., and White, J.) expressly disagreed with Justice Stewart's opinion

regarding the plain view issue. Id- at 492-527.
Lower courts have argued that the plain view issue raised by the plurality
opinions was considered by an equally divided Court, and, therefore, was not
actually decided; nevertheless, the Court ordered suppression of the evidence
obtained. See Wallin, The UncertainScope of the Plan View Doctrine, 16 U.
BALT. L. Rev. 266 (1987) (analysis of confusion in state courts concerning plain
view doctrine); 2 W LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.11 (2d ed. 1987) (same).
For a discussion of the lower courts' split on the inadvertence requirement following Coolidge, see znfra note 24.
8. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304.
9. For a discussion of the fourth amendment's protection of an individual's
possessory interest, see znfrz notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
10. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304. The treasurer's duties included collecting the
revenues from the San Jose Corn Club annual show. Respondent's Response in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct.
2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164). On the night of the robbery, the treasurer arrived
home at the end of the final day of the corn show with approximately $10,000 in
cash and currency in a briefcase, approximately $20,000 in collector coins of his
own, and approximately $1,200 cash in his own pocket. Id
11. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304. Subsequent to the robbery, the treasurer recognized the voice of one of the attackers as the defendant, a fellow corn collector. I& At trial, the prosecution explained the voice identification: "Wallacker
[the robbery victim] was an ex-Air Force pilot. As a pilot he had been trained in
voice identification. He had a practiced ear and was used to listening carefully
to people's voices." Respondent's Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 7, Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164). The
victim's identification of the defendant was partially corroborated by a witness
who saw the robbers fleeing from the scene. Id. at 7-8.
12. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304. In addition to the coins and cash carred by
the treasurer, the robbers took three rings, a billfold, a credit card case, and the
contents of a garage safe which contained several more rings, some uncut rubles, and a wristwatch. Petitioner's Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164). The
weapons used in the crime were an Uzi machine gun, an electrical prod [stun
gun] and a revolver. Id
13. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304. At trial, the prosecutor admitted that "the
deputy district attorney who drafted this particular search warrant did less than
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pursuant to the search warrant, the police officers failed to locate
any stolen property.' 4 Upon finding weapons in plain view, however, the officers seized them along with other items. 15 At trial, an
officer testified that he was searching for and intended to seize any
evidence that could be connected with the robbery, including items
not listed in the search warrant.16
Under the plain view doctrine, the trial court held that-.the
seizure was lawful and refused to suppress the evidence.' 7 The jury
convicted the defendant of armed robbery.' 8 In affirming the trial
court's decision, the California Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's argument that the plain view doctrine 19 barred the evidentiary use of items which were not particularly described m the
search warrant because discovery of the items was not inadvertent.20 The appellate court held that the Coolidge inadvertence requirement was not bmding 2 ' since only four members of the
a superlative job in listing what was normally sought in our county." Brief for
Respondent'at 6 n.3, Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164).
14. Horton v. Califorma, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (1990).
15. Id. at 2304-05. "Specifically he [Officer LaRault] seized an Uz machine
gun, a .38 caliber, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Corn Club advertising program, and a few items of clothing identified by the victim." Id. at 2305.
The officer discovered other weapons but did not seize them because he believed that they were not connected to the robbery. IM at 2305 n.1.
16. Id. at 2305. The absence of madveitence in this seizure was obvious. At
trial, Officer LaRault testified:
I was looking for some type of a mask that covers one's head; I was looking
for gloves; I was looking for a weapon, both the weapon described to me by
the victim in my interview, and also the one held by one suspect as he [was]
described by Mr. Wallacker [the robbery victim] and the other weapon being the small handgun being held by the second suspect. I was looking for
some kind of device that would produce a shock or burning sensation; I was
looking for handcuffs or similar handcuffs that indicate more handcuffs
could be found or keys for the handcuffs to unlock same; I was looking for
some evidence of the San Jose Coin Show and to find out if in fact Mr.
Horton [defendant] was at the coin show.
Petitioner's Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-23, Horton v.
California, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164).
17. Horton, 110 S.Ct. at'2305. After a preliminary examination heard on
August 23, 1985, in the California Mumcipal Court, Santa Clara County, Judicial District, the magistrate granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized. Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Horton v. California, 110 S.Ct. 2301
(1990) (No. 88-7164). On September 23, 1985, the trial court reversed the magistrate's order suppressing the evidence. I&dat 3.
18. The jury found the defendant guilty of armed robbery and he was sentenced to prison for eight years and eight months. Id.
19. For a discussion of the development of the plain view doctrine see suprm

note 3.
20. People v. Horton, No. H004177 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988).
21. Id. In North v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502

P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972), the California Supreme Court observed that
the portion of the Coolidge opinion which proposed the inadvertence requirement on the plain view doctrine was signed by only four members of the Court,

with four expressly disagreeing. Id. at 307, 502 P.2d at 1308, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
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Supreme Court endorsed the requirement. 22
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 23 to address the unresolved issue24 of whether the fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view if the
discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. 5 In affirming the
California Court of Appeals, 26 the Horton Court eliminated the
Coolidge plurality opinion's inadvertence requirement for the plain
view doctrine. 27 The Horton Court held that inadvertence is not a
necessary requirement for a plain view seizure, even though madvertence is a common element of most legitimate plain view
28
seizures.
Initially, the Court outlined the scope of its analysis. 29 The
Horton Court differentiated between the individual's privacy and
possessory interests protected by the fourth amendment 30 and de836. As a result, the issue was not actually decided and Coolidge had no precedential value on the inadvertence issue. Id. at 308, 502 P.2d at 1308, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 837. The California Supreme Court later followed the North decision in
People v. Miller, 196 Cal. App. 3d 846, 242 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1987). In Miller, the
court was persuaded that the inadvertence requirement had been specifically
rejected in North, and, consequently, they were "bound by stare decisis" to follow the earlier decision on the inadvertence issue. id. at 851, 242 Cal. Rptr. at
182. For a discussion of the Coolidge plurality opinion, see supra note 5.
22. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301,2305 (1990). On March 15,1989, the
California Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for review. Brief for
Petitioner at 4, Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164).
23. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 231 (1989).
24. Since Coolidge, three states (California, Utah, and Idaho) have rejected
the inadvertent discovery requirement. See People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046,
1075-76, 774 P.2d 659, 673-74, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 64445 (1989) (inadvertent requirement not binding as precedent since no majority reached in Coolidge), cert
demed, 110 S. Ct. 2632 (1990); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389-90 (Utah 1986)
(same); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 712-14, 518 P.2d 969, 973-74 (1974) (same).
The status of the inadvertence requirement in Delaware is unclear. See, e.g.,
Wicks v. State, 552 A.2d 462, 466 (Del. Supr. 1988) (seizure held valid although
police had knowledge that defendant had previously offered to sell illegal cameras to undercover agent).
On the other hand, forty-six states and the District of Columbia require
plain view seizures to be inadvertent. See Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2314-16 (list of
cases accepting the inadvertence requirement in state and United States Court
of Appeals jurisdictions). In addition, twelve United States Courts of Appeals
also accept the inadvertence requirement. Id.
This wide acceptance prompted Justice Powell to state "[w]hatever my
view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late
date to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception. It has been accepted
generally for over a decade." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 746 (1983) (Powell,
J., concurring in judgment).
25. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304.
26. Id. at 2311.
27. Id. at 2308. For a discussion of the Coolidge decision, see supra note 5.
28. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304.
29. Id. at 2306.
30. Id. A search involves an infringement on an individual's privacy interest while a seizure is an interference with an individual's possessory interest in

1991]

Horton v. Calfornza

termined that its analysis would only concern the defendant's possessory interest associated with the officer's seizure of his
property.3 ' Once an item comes into plain view, the Court adduced
that the governmental search has already compromised the individual's prvacy interest.3 2 Further, the Horton Court stated that,
although its analysis would focus on Coolidge's plurality opinion,
33
the Coolidge discussion of plain view was not binding precedent.
The Court found, however, that the Coolidge holding which suppressed the unlawfully seized evidence was itself binding.34
After defining the scope of its analysis, the Horton Court identified two flaws in the Coolidge rationale which established the
plain view inadvertence requirement s5 First, the Court found that
objective standards should be used to effectuate "evenhanded law
enforcement," rather than an inadvertence standard which focuses
on the subjective state of mind3 6 of an officer.3 7 The Court reasoned that the state of mind of an officer is irrelevant under the
plain view exception since an officer with "knowledge approaching
certainty" that an item would be found m a search would have no
property. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 716 (1983). Because the "seizure" of. property concept is
rarely discussed in Supreme Court cases, the definition of "seizure" of property
comes from the definition of "seizure" of a person under the fourth amendment. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.5 (1984)' Thus, the Court defines seizure of
property as meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in
property. Id. Cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 n.5 (1981) (a police
officer has seized a person whenever freedom to walk away has been restrained); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (without probable cause, a
police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person
seized is involved in criminal activity); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 551-554 (1980) (discusses definition of "seizure of a person").
31. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2306 (1990).
32. Ida
33. Id. at 2307. The Supreme Court ruled that the Coolidge plurality opin-

ion was not binding precedent prior to Horton. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
737 (1983).
34. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2307. With an increase in non-majority opmions
such as Coolidge, lower courts are unsure whether these opinions have any
precedential value. Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majo-rityDecson: A
Study sn Stare Decwzs, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956) (no standard for lower
courts facing non-majority decisions). Compare Manning v. Palmer, 381 F
Supp. 713, 715 (D. Ariz. 1974) (court follows the Supreme Court's four to three
demsion as law); with Roofing Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Palmer, .108 Ariz. 508, 512,
502 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1972) (court will not declare statute unconstitutional until
United States Supreme Court reaches a clear majority).
35. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308.
36. One author has noted that "[t]he most serious problem with the plurality's approach to plain view [in Coolidge] is that Justice Stewart nowhere defined the degree of expectation required to make a discovery by the police
inadvertent." The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 244 (1971).
See znfra note 59 for a discussion of the difficulty in defining inadvertence.
37. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2308-09 (1990).
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reason to leave that item off the warrant application. 38 In support
of this holding, the Court reasoned that an officer actually has an
mcentave to list items in the warrant application because once the
item is m the warrant, an officer has the lawful authority to search
anywhere in which there is probable cause to believe that an item
may be found. 39 In addition, the Horton Court concluded that
seizure of an item which is not listed in the search warrant but is
discovered during a lawful search for a listed item, would put an
individual's fourth amendment rights in only "minor peril" because
the individual's possessory interest would have been compromised
with a seizure of an item listed in the search warrant.40
Second, the Horton Court determined the Coolidge reasoning,
that an inadvertence requirement prevents limited lawful searches,
from becoming general illegal searches, was unpersuasive. 41 The
Horton Court found that the fourth amendment already prevents
general searches by its requirement that items must be particularly
described within the warrant. 42 The Court pointed out that once an
officer is lawfully in a position to see an item in plain view, the
inadvertence requirement is unnecessary because "no additional
Fourth Amendment interest is furthered." 43 The Court added that
the inadvertence requirement's purpose of protecting against general searches is already served by strict adherence to the warrant
requirement, which limits the area and duration of a search conducted under the authority of a valid warrant. 44 The Court concluded, however, that any evidence seized in a search that goes
beyond the bounds of a valid search warrant,45 or an established
exception to a warrant, violates the fourth amendment and renders
38. Id. at 2309. Police officers would have no reason to intentionally leave
items they intend to seize off a warrant, and "[o]nly oversight or careless mistake would explain an omission in the warrant application." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 517 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
39. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
40. Horton, 110 S.Ct. at 2309 (quoting Coolidge,403 U.S. at 516 (White, J.,
dissenting)).
41. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2309-10. Justifications for an officer to be present lawfully indude: (1) a warrant for another object, (2) hot pursuit, (3) search incident to
lawful arrest, or (4) any other lawful reason. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 466 (1971). For further discussion of justifications for lawful police
presence, see rnfra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
44. Horton, 110 S.Ct. at 2309-10.
45. The scope of a search conducted under the authority of a properly issued search warrant is limited to those areas in which a reasonable person is
likely to find the items listed in the warrant. Id. at 2311 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). Thus, "a police officer
cannot search for a lawninower in a bedroom, or for an undocumented alien in a
suitcase." Horton, 110 S.Ct. at 2311 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the evidence invalid.4 6
The Horton decision is flawed for three reasons. First, the
Court's elimination of the plain view doctrine's inadvertence requirement renders the fourth amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements meangless. 47 If inadvertence is not required,
then, under the plain view doctrine, officers can intend to and lawfully seize items without first obtaining a search warrant for these
particular items from a neutral magistrate based on probable
cause.48 Second, the Court erred in applying the plain view doctrine to the facts under Horton.49 The plain view doctrine does not
apply to the facts in Horton because the warrant clause's particularity requirement 50 mandates that if an officer intends to seize certain items at the time of his application for a search warrant, as was
the case in Horton, the warrant must "particularly describe the
things to be seized," otherwise the seizure of those items is unlawful.5 1 Finally, the Court erroneously devalued the fourth amend-

ment's constitutional protection of an individual's possessory
interests by eliminating the madvertence requirement. 52
First, the Court's elimination of the inadvertence requirement
renders the fourth amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements5 3 meaningless. Without the inadvertence requirement,
officers can intend to and lawfully seize items without a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate1 based on probable cause.5 5 In
46. Id at 2310. Once items listed in a search warrant have been found, the
search must terminate. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 517 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
47. For a discussion of the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement, see snfra note 55 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of possible police misconduct under the plain view doctrine without the inadvertence requirement, see nfra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
49. For a discussion of the inapplicability of the plain view doctrine under
Horton, see znfra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
50. See znfra note 67 for a discussion of the particularity requirement.
51. See znfra notes 70-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of seizures
held unlawful due to invalid warrants.
52. See rnfra notes 98-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
infringement of possessory rights.
53. The warrant clause states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. " U.S. CONsT. amend. IV
54. The traditional fourth amendment requirement of ,a neutral and detached magistrate issuing the warrant comes from the basic constitutional doctrine that separation of powers among the ,different branches of government
will best preserve individual rights. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407
U.S. 297, 317 (1972). A search and seizure should be a combined effort of the
police gathering evidence of wrongful acts and a neutial magistrate's deternnation that the evidence is sufficient to justify an invasion of an individual's
privacy rights. I&i at 316. Through this process, the existence of the probable
cause necessary for a constitutional search and seizure is determined by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officers engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United
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Horton, the officer seized only items not particularly described or
even listed m the search warrants 6 Thus, the magistrate did not
57
make a probable cause determination for any of the items seized.
This is a direct violation of the express language of the fourth
58
amendment.
In Horton, the Court's conclusion that "evenhanded law enforcement" would best be achieved through objective standards
rather than the subjective standards used with "inadvertence" is
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979)
(magistrate issuing a warrant minimizes the risk of unreasonable assertions of

executive authority); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979)
(warrants must describe items to be seized so nothing is left to the discretion of
the officers); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (protection
against unlawful searches best achieved through neutral magistrates rather
than "petty officers acting under the excitement that attends the capture of
persons accused of crime"). See generally 2 W LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 4.2 (2d ed. 1987) (discussion of the neutral and detached magistrate
requirement).
55. Probable cause for a search warrant exists 'where 'the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting from Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). Probable cause "does not demand any showing
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Therefore, belief beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. Id- Probable cause does, however, require a stronger belief than a mere
suspicion. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (person's spatial
closeness to others suspected of crime does not alone give rise to probable
cause).

56. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2304-05 (1990).
57. In Horton, the officer's subsequent testimony about the existence of
probable cause for the items seized would not correct the insufficiency of the
warrant application. I&i The officer failed to disclose this information to the
issuing magistrate for a detached determination of probable cause. I& A rule
allowing subsequent testimony to correct an insufficient warrant application
would "render the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless." Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971).
58. The Supreme Court has held that exceptions to the warrant requirement which violate the language of the fourth amendment should be carefully
scrutinized. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In Katz, the Court
held that the government's electromc eavesdropping on the defendant's conversation from a public telephone booth violated the defendant's privacy rights
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 359. The Court concluded that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 357. Because exceptions to the warrant requirement invariably compromise interests
protected by the fourth amendment, the few situations in which a warrantless
search may be conducted have been carefully delineated, and the burden is on
those seeking the exception to show the need for it. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 760 (1979). See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)
(warrantless seizures "per se unreasonable"); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 825 (1982) (same); United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 318
(1972) (warrant requirement exceptions are "few in number and carefully
delineated").
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more practical, 59 but it jeopardizes the individual rights protected
by the inadvertence requirement. 60 In reaching its decision, the
Court failed to consider the possible misconduct of police officers
that could result from the elimination of the inadvertence from the
plain viewdoctrme. Without a magistrate's probable cause deterimnation, police officers could delay arrests,6 1 deliberately time arrests,62 leave specific items off search warrant applications, 63 or
engage in "pretextual" searches64 Thus, the consequence of elinn59. Courts are having difficulty in applying the inadvertence requirement
because the Coolidge decision failed to give any exact definition of "inadvertent"; thus, the degree of expectation required to make a discovery inadvertent
has not been resolved. Comment, "PlainView" - Anything But Plazn: Coolidge Divues the Lower Courts,7 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 489,507-14 (1974); Comment,
Crmznal Procedure-"Inadvertence" The Increaszngly Vestigzal Prong of the
Plain View Doctrne,10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 399,401 (1980). However, commentators generally agree that courts are following the definition which holds that
a discovery is inadvertent if the police are without probable cause to believe
that the evidence will be found. Moylan, supra note 3, at 1083; The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REV. 3, 244 (1971). Thus, under the plain view
doctrine, the inadvertence requirement prevents planned warrantless seizures.
60. The Coolidge Court added the inadvertence requirement to the plain
view doctrine so that the scope of searches incident to arrest would not be extended. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctne Exception to the WarrantRequzrement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. .419, 422 (1973). See
supra note 3 for a discussion of the relationship between the plain view doctrine
and search incident to arrest. In Horton, Justice Brennan stated that, with the
inclusion of the inadvertence requirement in the plain view doctrine, police officers will be held to the warrant requirement to seize items if the officers know
the location of the items, have probable cause to seize the items, intend to seize
the items, and fail to get a search warrant particularly describing the items.
Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If officers were not held to
follow this requirement, their acts would violate the express constitutional requirement of the particularity clause and would "fly in the face of the basic rule
that no amount of probable cause can 3ustify a warrantless search." Id. (quoting
Justice Stewart in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971)). See
also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967) (Court cannot "forgive the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement").
61. Police officers could delay arrests until suspects are in their residences,
with the hope of seizing evidence which they would not have been able to obtain
with a warrant. Lewis & Mannle, WarrantlessSearches and the "PlainView"
Doctrine: CurrentPerspective, 12 CRIM. L. BuLL. 5, 19 (1976).
62. Without the inadvertence requirement, officers having probable cause
for one offense, may make a deliberately timed arrest in order to discover evidence of another crime. Id63. Police officers may purposely leave certain items off a search warrant
application which they have probable cause to seize, know the location of, and
intend to seize, and list only hard to find items in order to expand the scope of
the search. Horton v. Califorma, 110 S. Ct. 2361, 2313 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The warrant application process can take a long time, especially when
the police intend to seize many items. By listing only hard to find items, an
officer nght find the "risk of immediately discovering items listed in the warrant.
outweighed by the time saved in the application process." Id.
64. A police officer conducts a pretextual search when that officer enters a
house under a search warrant to seize items of one crime when the officer really is interested in seizing items from another crime. Id, See, e.g., State v. Lair,
95 Wash. 2d 706, 713, 630 P.2d 427, 434 (1981) (search for marijuana used as
"pretext" to search for other drugs may be invalidated). The United States
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nating the inadvertence requirement is the increased infringements
65
on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
Second, under the facts in Horton, the Court erroneously applied the plain view doctrine in upholding the seizure of items resulting from an unconstitutional search of the defendant's
residence. 66 The fourth amendment's particularity requirement
mandates that search warrants must "particularly describe" all
items the police officers intend to seize at the time of the application for a search warrant. 67 The Horton Court did not address the
fact that the police officer fully intended, at the time of the application for the search warrant, to seize various items which were not
listed in the search warrant. 68 Thus, in Horton, the magistrate issued a search warrant in violation of the particularity requirement,
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on "pretextual" searches. Horton v. Califorma, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2314 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, state courts
that have rejected the inadvertence requirement have held that the fourth
amendment prohibits pretextual searches. See State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781,
788 n.2, 760 P.2d 1197, 1204 n.2 (1988) (police may not use warrant as "pretext"
to look for additional items); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 n.1 (Utah 1986)
(same). In addition, law enforcement associations such as Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., the International Association of Clefs of Police,
Inc., the National District Attorneys Association, Inc., and the National Sheriff's Association, Inc., believe that the Supreme Court should make a rule protecting individuals agamst-pretextual searches. Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement in support of the Respondent at 8,
Horton v. California, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990) (No. 88-7164). These organizations
believe two elements should be established for inadvertency in the plain view
doctrine including. "(1) lack of pretext in the police conduct regarding their
presence at the place where the observation is made, and (2) objective reasonableness in their conduct." Id, For thorough discussions of pretextual searches,
see Burkoff, The PretextSearch Doctrtne: Now You See i4 Now You Don't, 17
U. Mi H. J.L. RrF. 523 (1984); 2 W LAFAVE, SEAnen ANDf SEizuRE § 4.11(e)

(1987).

65. Inconvemence to the police officers and some slight delay necessary to
prepare adequate papers to present to a magistrate are never convincing reasons to bypass the warrant requirement. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, 706 (1948), overruled, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
66. In Horton, there was no discussion of the validity of the warrant. The
Court mentioned only that the police officer determined that there was probable cause to believe the defendant may have been the robber, and the magistrate issued the warrant authorizing a search for three specifically described
rings. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304. The Horton Court disregarded Justice Stewart's statement in Coolidge that "plain view is never enough for a warrantless
search because any evidence seized will be in plain view, at least at the very
moment of seizure." Id.at 2307 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 468 (1971)).
67. The specificity mandated by the particularity requirement limits the
discretion of the executing officers and gives notice to the party being searched.
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
916 (1984). Allowing police officers to seize items not listed in the warrant, and
not inadvertently found, will reduce police officer's professional incentives to
comply with the fourth amendment, and encourage them to repeat their mistakes. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984).
68. See supra note 16 for Officer LaRault's testimony concerning his intent
to seize various items not listed in the warrant. The majority's opinion in Hor-
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and the police officer was acting under the authority of this invalid
search warrant when he seized items in the defendant's home. Consequently, the Court should have suppressed the illegally obtained
69
evidence.
In Horton, the search warrant's invalidity at the time of its issuance is analogous to warrants which contain incorrect addresses 7 °
or descriptions of items in generic terms.71 Courts have held these
warrants invalid because they violate the particularity requirement,
and any items seized under the authority of these invalid warrants
are inadmissible as evidence. 72 In fact, the Supreme Court has upton holds that this is constitutional. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2305
(1990).
69. Following the exclusionary rule, the Horton Court should have suppressed the items seized under the invalid warrant. The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an
unlawful search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the central purpose of the exclusionary rule is
to deter police misconduct. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879, 906 (1984)
(exclusionary rule to safeguard fourth amendment rights through deterrence of
police misconduct); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (same); United
States v. Jams, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (same); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 536 (1975) (same); Michigan v. Tucker,' 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (same);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (same).
70. Courts have held that incorrect addresses listed in search warrants violate the particularity requirement because they fail to specifically describe the
place to be searched. See, e.g., Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.
1980) (search conducted under authority of warrant listing incorrect address
constituted severe invasion of privacy); United States v. Kaye, 432 F.2d 647, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (search of an apartment located above the address listed in the
warrant rendered the warrant invalid). See also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560, 568 (1971) (validity of warrant appraised by facts given to the magistrate,
not facts later found to exist by officers).
71. Warrants which contain vague descriptions of items to be seized do not
satisfy the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment, and, consequently, any evidence seized under these invalid warrants is inadmissible. See,
e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979) (open-ended warrant
held invalid where items to be seized were listed as those items "similar" to
films which were already in police custody); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6,
8 (1st Cir. 1980) (warrant authorizing seizure of a broad class of documents
ruled invalid); United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 1977) (warrant
describing items as "stolen," "pirate," or "illegal" held invalid); United States v.
Owen, 621 F.Supp. 1498, 1505 (D.C.1Mich. 1985) ("instrumentalities relating to
the distribution of controlled substance" too vague to uphold under particularity requirement); United States v. Perez, 562 F.Supp. 574, 576 (D.N.J. 1982)
("controlled substances" impermissibly vague where government knew that
heroin was the object of the search); United States v. Townsend, 394 F.Supp.
736, 746 (E.D.Mich. 1975) (warrant listing "stolen firearms, app. ten (10), which
are stored in the above location" held invalid).
In Horton, the warrant contained an inaccurate description of the items the
officer intended to seize because these items were not listed. Horton, 110 S. Ct.
at 2304-05. Following the established rule stated in the cases above, the Horton
Court should have ruled that the warrant was invalid, and, consequently, that
the items seized were obtained unlawfully.
72. Unlike the case in Horton, items seized under an illegal but facially
valid search warrant obtained in good faith are admissible. Leon, 468 U.S. at
914. In Leon, the Court stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no pro-
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held the suppression of evidence in cases very similar to Horton
where the police officers intended to seize certain items during a
search, but failed to obtain a warrant listing the items. 73 Therefore,
in Horton, once the warrant was found to be invalid, the Court
should have suppressed the items seized in the defendant's home. 74
Finally, the Horton Court diminished the fourth amendment's
constitutional protection of an individual's possessory interest by
eliminating the inadvertence requirement. 75 In drafting the fourth
amendment, the framers specifically sought to prevent general
searches and seizures by prohibiting searches and seizures which
are not based on probable cause, and by requiring searches deemed
visions expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.
" I& at 906. The Leon Court, however, did identify several
exceptions in which illegally seized items would be suppressed regardless of
"good faith." I& at 914. First, a warrant based on knowledge of reckless falsehood contained in the affidavit is invalid. Id, See also Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in
warrant application will render warrant invalid). Second, a warrant issued by a
"rubber stamp" magistrate is invalid because the requirement that the determination of probable cause be made by a neutral magistrate is essentially eliminated. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)
(magistrates must analyze the "totality of the circumstances" to determine
probable cause); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (magistrate must not
serve as mere "rubber stamp" for the police). Third, if the supporting affidavit
for the warrant lacks any indication of probable cause so as to render the belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable, then the evidence seized under the invalid warrant is inadmissible. Leon, 468 U.S. at 915. Finally, evidence will be suppressed if a warrant is facially deficient so that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid. Id at 923. Cf.Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988-91 (1984) (magistrate's assurances to officers of warrant's validity justified officer's good faith reliance on warrant).
The last exception detailed in Leon would apply to the facts under Horton.
The officer in Horton acknowledged his intention to seize items which were not
listed in the warrant. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2305. Officer LaRault could not have
reasonably presumed the warrant to be valid because it was facially deficient.
Therefore, the evidence seized should have been suppressed.
73. By allowing the items seized in Horton to be admitted as evidence, the
Court clearly deviated from precedent. In Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,
298 (1984), the Court held that evidence seized by an arson investigative team
was obtained unlawfully where the team searched the upstairs of a residence
after finding evidence of arson in the basement. The Court concluded that after
the team found a crock pot set with a timer in the basement, they went upstairs
fully intending to discover items connected to the arson. Id. at 298-99. The investigator's failure to obtain a valid warrant in light of the fact that they had
ample time to do so, rendered the evidence discovered madmissible. Id at 299.
The Court has reached similar conclusions in other cases. See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984) (Court refused to allow items into evidence
after two hour "exploratory search" of a murder scene); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 389-90 (1978) (four day warrantless search not justified under any exception to fourth amendment where police had opportunity to secure warrant);
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1970) (warrantless seizure of narcotics unreasonable since police had time to obtain a warrant).
74. For a discussion of the suppression of evidence under the exclusionary
rule, see supra note 69.
75. See supra note 60 for a discussion of the inadvertence requirement.
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necessary to be as limited as possible. 76 'The fourth amendment's
warrant clause effectuates these goals by requiring a neutral magistrate to evaluate probable cause, 7 7 and by requiring warrants to specifically list the place and items to be searched and seized. 7s
Like most constitutional rules, the fourth amendment's warrant requirement has exceptions. 79 In addition to the plain view
doctrine, the Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches based
on hot pursuit,8 0 automobile searches, 8 ' consent,8 2 search incident
to arrest,8

3

border searches,84 "stop and frisk" situations,85 and road

76. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). For other discus-

sions of these goals, see Lewis & Mannie, supra note 61, at 17; Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Platn View Exception to the Warrant

Requzrement-Extgent Circumstances-Washington v. Chnsman, 29 N.Y.L. SCH.

L. REV. 125, 132-33 (1984).
77. For a discussion of the neutral magistrate requirement, see supra note

54.
78. For a discussion of the particularity requirement, see supra note 67.
79. For the most part, exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirements are based upon a conclusion that, under certain circumstances, the
exigencies of a situation make immediate search and seizure without a warrant
imperative. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1965). For discussions of the exigencies, see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 (1983); Lewis &
Mannile, supranote 61, at 6; Salken, BalancingExigency and Privacy zn Warrantless Searches to Prevent Destructionof Endence: The Need for a Rule, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 283 (1988); Note, Texas v. Brown: The Plain View Doctrine
Stretched Beyond the Visual, 16 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 151, 157 n.26 (1984).
80. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The Court held that the police
may enter a private place without a warrant in pursuit of a suspect in an exigent
situation. Id. at 298-99. The Court gave the prevention of the escape of the
suspect and harm to the officers as the primary rationale underlying the hot
pursuit exception. Id. at 299. The scope of the search under tis exception may
be as broad as is reasonably necessary to prevent the danger of resistance or

escape by the suspect. Id.
81. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). The Court explained that the
automobile's mobility created the exigent circumstance which excused the warrant requirement. Id. at 806-07. In addition, the Court concluded that there is a
diminished expectation surrounding an automobile, and therefore, a velhcle
does not deserve the fullest level of fourth amendment protection. Id. at 805-09.
82. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, the
Court held that even lacking sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant, police could conduct a warrantless search of a suspect who voluntarily gave consent. Id. at 222-23.
83. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). For a discussion of the search
incident to arrest exception, see supra note 3.
84. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In AlmeidaSanchez, the Court concluded that travellers may be stopped at international
borders in order to ascertain whether the individual entering is entitled to
enter, and whether the belongings brought in are lawful. IE at 272.
85. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court held that where
police officers observe unusual conduct, in light of their experience they may
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of an individual in an
attempt to discover weapons. Id. at 30.
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blocks.8 6 The Court has ruled that each of these exceptions must be
the fundawell delineated and carefully drawn in order to preserve
87
mental constitutional goals of the fourth amendment.
In Coolidge, the Court formally established the plain view exception to the warrant clause 8 8 The Court 3ustified this exception
by balancing the individual's interests against the governmental interests.8 9 The Coolidge Court concluded that the gains in effective
law enforcement 90 resulting from the plain view doctrine outweighed the minor harm inflicted on the fourth amendment. 91 After concluding that the exception was justified, the Court carefully
delineated the parameters of the doctrine to protect the interests
covered by the fourth amendment. 92 The Court included the inadvertence requirement as a substitute for the warrant requirements
when officers conducted warrantless searches. Therefore, the Coolidge Court established the inadvertence requirement to protect an
individual's possessory interest in the absence of the warrant
93
requirements.
86. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse,the Court held that
an articulable and reasonable suspicion is required for police officers to stop an
automobile and detain the driver. Id. at 663.
87. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 (1971); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
88. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443. For a discussion of the Coolidge decision and
the requirements of the plain view doctrine, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
89. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. Justice Stewart's use of the balancing test m
Coolidge focuses on the area of fourth amendment law which addresses the reasonableness of the governmental intrusion. See United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579,588 (1983) (customs officers' boarding of sailboat without
a warrant held reasonable under fourth amendment). The Supreme Court
evaluated the permissibility of a law enforcement practice by balancing the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests against the gain in law
enforcement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). See also United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-62 (1976) (government interest in
traffic spotchecks outweighs interests of private citizens); United States v.
Brignom-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-82 (1975) (government interest m preventing
entry of illegal aliens outweighs interests of individuals); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 26-27 (1968) (police and public safety outweigh intrusion on individual's privacy with "stop and frisk" search).
90. Coolidge,403 U.S. at 468. In Coolidge,Justice Stewart stated that where
police inadvertently discover a piece of evidence during a lawful search, it
would be inconvenient, and sometimes dangerous, to require the officers to
leave the evidence until they obtained a warrant. 1d.
91. Id. at 467.
92. Id. at 465-66.
93. There is certainly no inconvemence to police officers in requrimg them
to obtain a search warrant from a neutral magistrate, specifically describing the
items they can seize, if the police know of a particular item that they want to
seize. Id. at 471. But, in Horton, the officer created the exigency which allowed
him to seize items without a valid warrant by not listing all the items he intended to seize m the warrant application. Thus, the officer used the plan view
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Unpersuaded by the Coolidge reasoning,94 the Horton Court
held that the inadvertence requirement was unnecessary because it
failed to further any fourth amendment mterests.9 5 In Horton,the
Court correctly found that when an officer seizes items under the
plain view doctrine, the officer's presence on the premises under an
initially valid warrant has already compromised an individual's priHowever, the Court incorrectly concluded that
once an officer has lawful right of access "no additional Fourth
Amendment interest is furthered" by the inadvertence requirement. 97 The Court's conclusion is contrary to decisions where the
Court has held that the-privacy interests and possessory interests
vacy interest.96

98
protected by the fourth amendment are equally important, but, at
99
In Horton, the Court failed
the same tune, separate and distinct.
to separate the equally important possessory interest from the privacy interest when it eliminated the inadvertence requirement.
The Court compromised an individual's possessory interest on the

sole basis that an individual's privacy interest had already been
compromised. 1° The Court's illogical reasoning led to the elimination of the inadvertence requirement, and, consequently, diminished the individual's possessory interest which the fourth

doctrine to seize items without abiding by the warrant requirements of the
fourth amendment.
94. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (1990). See supra notes 35-46
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Horton Court's analysis of

Coolidge.
95. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.
96. With an item already in plain view, neither its observation nor its
seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
325 (1987); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765,371 (1983). However, seizure of the
article in plain view would obviously invade the owner's possessory interest.
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984).
97. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.
98. The privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment injunction
against unreasonable searches is uniquely different from the possessory interest
protected by the prohibition against unreasonable seizures. However, they are
of equal value and require the same protection. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
328 (1987). See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748 (1983) (privacy interests and
possessory interests not always present to the same extent). But see Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against winch the wording of the fourth amendment is directed); United States
v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1971) (same); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (principal object of the fourth amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property).
99. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 747 (1983).
100. In Horton, Justice Brennan was so dissatisfied with the majority's illogical reasoning that he wrote: "I cannot countenance such constitutional legerdemam." Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2313 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).

The John Marshall Law Retnew

[Vol. 24:891

amendment protects. 1° 1
By eliminating the inadvertence requirement from the plain
view doctrine, the Horton Court took another step towards total
elimination of the possessory interest protected by the fourth
amendment. With our society's current goal of reducing crime, the
Court has once again increased police authority in balancing the
governmental interest against individual interests the constitution
protects. Fortunately, the decision's broad scope eliminates the
problem of defining inadvertence, which has plagued the lower
courts since the Coolidge decision. However, the courts now face
the task of protecting possessory interests under the plain view doctrine without an important safeguard. When faced with severe police misconduct, the Supreme Court will have to reevaluate the
requirements of the plain view doctrine once again. Unfortunately,
in Horton, the Court neglected to remember that "[ilt is the duty of
the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
10 2
and against any stealthy encroachment thereon."'
John A. Mack

101. Lawful interference with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement does not justify the automatic intrusion on an individual's possessory interest which would otherwise require a warrant. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 766 n.12 (1969).
102. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (emphasis added).

